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CRIMINAL procedure is a microcosm of universal significance. It is
the repository of present understanding of serious controversy-solving
as well as the promise of any enduring solution of major conflict in
any field whatever. For in the procedure of criminal law, we read the
history of man's halting circuitous ascent from resort to vengeful fetid
and sheer annihilation to that of peaceful and intelligent adjudication.
To appreciate .both the conceit and the solemnity of such endeavor, one
must recall, also, the long history of superstitious reliance on chance
as well as that of dependence upon the Oracle or other authority. The
almost unimaginable advance represented in modern criminal procedure
has not meant progress merely of professionals. Criminal procedure is
a community's way of life in its areas of greatest stress. If rational
settlement is possible here, where emotion and instinctual drive beat
hardest upon restraint and intelligence, it should be possible in every
field of human conduct. Hence the current undertaking for revision of
federal criminal procedure, though it demands the nicest of technician's
skill, in its wider significance challenges American scholarship to under-
stand its basic complex nature and the ramifications of its social as well
as its legal functions.
The current project calls for "revision", and "revision" may be as-
sumed to mean not merely change, but reform, i.e., change in desirable
directions. The premise is that such change is possible, that we are not
simply indulging in pious hopes. At the same time, the history of pro-
cedural reform should dissipate any lingering naive optimism in this
regard. In very recent years, e.g., in states which have adopted new
codes of criminal procedure, courts have nullified some of the most im-
portant reforms (such as the requirement to object to defects in an
indictment before trial) by reversion to the prior decisions. The long
tradition of present procedure, the deep imprint of professional methods,
and most of all, the existing range of thought and evaluation, all impose
rigorous limitations on actual deliberate change as distinguished from
talking about it or enacting new rules. Nonetheless it is a persuasive
hypothesis that there are wide and important areas in procedure suscepti-
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ble to modification over a period of time by well considered programs
of reform.
To discover these areas and to institute such programs, criminal
procedure must be understood as an integral phase of what is rather
euphemistically called "the administration of criminal justice." Viewed
in the large, what is presented to our analysis is an organization of ideas
implemented by methods designed to their realization. This totality is
usually divided into substance, procedure, and practice (discretion), but
without considering any differentiae at this time, we may note that
procedure and substance have to do with explicitly stated prescriptions,
and that "practice" (e.g., the choice of personnel, the organization of a
state's attorney's office, the waiver of felony charges, the keeping of
records) is concerned with judgment not closely directed by such rules.
What needs to be stressed is the mutual dependence of one upon the
other, and the inevitable adaptation of each of the above three divisions
of criminal justice to the conditions and changes in the other. Thus,
it is well established that if the substantive laws are unduly severe, in-
dictments will be gone over with the finest of combs - technicalities
abound. The social effects of penal laws are accordingly influenced con-
siderably by criminal procedure. If police are incompetent, the legislators
rush in to stem the crime wave -by enacting substantive laws, just as
both police and prosecutors are discouraged in their diligence if known
offenders slip through a maze of artificial refinements in the procedure.
It is evident that natural temptations to extend the import of procedure
and of any specialized analyses must be restrained, but the relationship
of procedure to the other chief elements in the total process can be in-
vestigated, and the particular problems arising from such interdependence
at least formulated.
LOGICAL FUNCTIONS AND OBJECTIVES
The present project for revision of federal criminal procedure has
possibilities of such range and significance that the problem challenges
not only to a consideration of special and immediate difficulties and
objectives but, even more, to an examination of the basic functions and
ends of any rational system of criminal procedure. In fact, both types
of problems are closely integrated.
Objectives of revision must build on the objectives of criminal pro-
cedure; "objectives" transcend "functions" though they are sometimes
similarly formulated; discovery of the former depends on knowledge of
the latter - these are the initial elementary premises of our analysis.
Professionals sometimes give the appearance of believing that proce-
dure was created for their special interests, not least to provide the
entertainment of a fascinating play - in which trait, they do not differ
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markedly from other human beings. Hence a first obvious observation
as to 'both functions and objectives is that criminal procedure is also a
sort of public utility which at least purports to provide better service
in direct proportion to its rationality. To characterize any method as
"rational" is, firstly, to assert that people can and do think, secondly,
that it makes a great difference whether they think or employ sonic other
method of discovery, and, thirdly, that the method employed is designed
to facilitate the discovery of truth, rather than retard it. It is necessary
to stress the fact that criminal procedure is a method of discovery, not
one of demonstration of accepted truths. To comprehend the rational
function of procedure it is essential to keep in mind that we start not
- with answers but with questions, that the entire apparatus is defensible
and intelligible only on the premise that we seek answers which we
initially do not possess, mid that we seek the best answers possible.
It is apparent, also, that procedure can be logical even though the sub-
stantive law is unjust or irrational. That is to say, procedure discharges
certain logical functions, the results of which are not necessarily desir-
able. As Aristotle put it, "What makes a man a 'sophist' is not his
faculty, but his moral purpose."' But whatever the justice of the ulti-
mate decisions, rational procedure provides the best instruments for
discovery of the necessary answers.
The substantive criminal law determines the kind of questions we
must ask; rational procedure, embodying logical principles, prescribes
what steps we must take and how we shall take them to secure the neces-
sary answers. The general descriptions of fact included in the substantive
law, known as the hypotheses or behavior-circumstances elements, fix the
ultimate targets. Criminal procedure is designed to apply these general
norms to particular cases, and the steps leading to such concretization
have been variously described. From the viewpoint of total administra-
tion, these are the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction and
treatment of criminals. From the procedural viewpoint these terms are
inappropriate. Here our concern is with the intellectual (and authorita-
tive) process of securing answers to the questions raised in light of the
substantive criminal law. The steps requisite to such decision are a trial,
presupposing correct methods have secured the attention of a court,
formulation of the issues fixed by the substantive law, the introduction
of evidential data before a court which must decide one way or the
other, and the entry of judgment accordingly. Thus the rules of proce-
dure for the most part govern a particular kind of debate -one that
differs rather in the potentiality of practical effects than in any essential
of argument generally.
The presence of the defendant is not necessary to the conduct of the
argument, however fair it may be to provide opportunity to attend. For-
1. AmsmoTE, RHETS lCA, Bk. I. i. 14.
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mulation of issues is the initial logical requisite. If we keep in mind the
nature of the inquiry as indicated above, we can evaluate overly-ambitious
schemes to "simplify" pleading that border on its total abolition. If a
trial is to be had it must be relevant to issues thai are necessarily raised;
"notice" pleading does not in the slightest degree modify the logical con-
ditions of rational procedure. Notice pleading is a significant possible
method of eliminating unnecessary technicality and delay. It contains no
magic that can dispense with the necessity of formulating issues. More-
over, it seems clear that in federal criminal procedure especially, but
largely, also, in the states, many major evils of technical pleading have
practically disappeared because of general insistence on substantial dam-
age ;2 hence recitation of the exorbitant meticulosity of the past century
is simply irrelevant. In addition, there is reason to believe that bills of
particulars would handicap prosecution whereas reasonably detailed plead-
ing does not. Accordingly the indicated direction for reform is infornial
pleading and modern vocabulary.
Simple terms can be employed to symbolize the various elements in
offenses which need not be pleaded; certainly there is no reason to cling
to the ritual of traditional verbiage that enshrouds them. Indeed, to an
unconditioned mind, traditional common law pleading must seem Ct
museum-piece, a bizarre logomachy, a device to extract issues "like the
roots of an equation." 3 Little overstatement is Holmes' remark on "the
inability of the 17th century common law to accept a pleading that did
not eclude every misinterpretation capable of occurring to an intelli-
gence fired with a desire to pervert."' But we must not permit peculiarity
of language and excess of technicality to conceal the essential ends that
such pleading served in the formulation of issues. We may condemn the
extremes to which rigorous insistence on singularity and certainty led
(although a fair interpretation of administration of the severe 17th
century penal law might suggest that technicality had significance and
value) but "avoidance of obscurity and confusion, of prolixity and
delay"' are certainly high desiderata in any rational procedure. The
indictment serves not only to frame issues by stating material facts clearly
but it serves at the same time to warn the defendant and permit him fair
opportunity to prepare his defense and, also, to avoid double jeopardy.
It is necessary to discover excessive technicality and rigidity and to
eliminate them; it is possible to frame the issues by instruments or even
oral proceedings that we do not call "pleadings"; so, too, other pro-
2. See MISSOURI CRIME SURVEY (1926) 249; HARNo, ILLINOIS CIIM SURVEY
(1929) 185.
3. WARREN, LAW STUDIES 208, quoted by SThI HEN, PRINCIPLES OF PuiAowo (Au-
drews' ed. 1901) 16.
4. Paraiso v. United States, 207 U. S. 368, 372 (1907).
5. STEPHEN, PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING (Andrews' ed. 1901) 262.
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vision can be made for avoidance of double jeopardy. Fornal innova-
tions are available, but it will be difficult to make actual gains in these
directions beyond that provided for in recent codes; we shall assuredly
fail to do so if we lose sight of the irreducible requirements of rational
trial. WVe must remember, finally, that instead of the rampant irresponsi-
bility that characterized pleading in civil litigation, in the criminal law
there have been supervision and check by grand jury, public prosecutor
and preliminary hearing.
The issues, however formulated, must consist of contradictory asser-
tions regarding the material facts. Two types of questions are involved:
do the facts charged fall within the behavior-circumstances of any specific
penal law, and secondly, did the facts charged actually occur? It will be
agreed that fact-finding and law-finding should proceed in an orderly
manner, designed to secure the distinctive necessary answers to the
material questions. The argument must be advanced, and the rules of
procedure must accordingly reflect the logical requirements of such con-
troversy, e.g., as to who must begin, what is the burden of proof and the
like. In addition, there must be rules of convenience, such as the time
of beginning, the length of argument, etc. There must be rules of
decorum, e.g., both parties should not speak simultaneously, and in a
courtroom, the prestige of the judicial institution suggests appropriate
forms of address. Facts relevant to the issues must be introduced and
these data must be interpreted and evaluated. Accordingly, it will be seen
that the law of procedure incorporates principles of organization, of
logic and empirical knowledge, of convenience and decorum, and of
policy.
Criticism of procedure must be in terms of objectives and in terms
of present means of their implementation. What needs discovery and
careful formulation is a series of cogent standards to serve as bases for
evaluation.' The literature of criticism of criminal justice is voluminuUs
and it is not easy to ascertain the implicit criteria employed. This litera-
ture may conveniently be divided into the following general types: first,
that concerned with the process of procedure from an internal or logical
viewpoint; secondly, that based on political-ethical viewpoints. Emphasis
is on the certainty of recognized methods of procedure and the value
of this for stability, the restraint imposed on officials, not least on their
cupidity and ignorance, the value of uniformity; most of such evaluation
is applicable to substantive law as well. Finally, there is a considerable
literature written from a practical, administrative viewpoint; criticism is
in terms of delay, cost, efficiency, and the like, e.g., the crime surveys.
From the description above of the rules included in procedure, it is
6. See 2 BENTHAM, WORIKS (Bowring's ed. 1843) 17; 2 Liwm sTNo", Ci, Iru:
%VORKS ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE (1873) 186-87.
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apparent that criticism and standards must be formulated accordingly,
in light of the variety of types of rules, their respective functions and
objectives. The range of possible criticism is no less than that of logic,
science, ethics and sound judgment in the conduct of practical, affairs.
THE BASIC DILEMMA OF CRIMINAL PROCE:DURE
None of the above sources, forms or standards of criticism has any
relevance or utility apart from the ultimate ends of criminal procedure
-to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent. Only in the light of
this distinctive dual objective of criminal procedure can any intelligent
judgment be made as to the logical, scientific, ethical or' efficient quality
of any method, proposal or reform. Hence the most important single
generalization that can be made about American criminal procedure or
for that matter about any civilized criminal procedure is that its ultimate
ends are dual and conflicting. It must be designed from inception to
end, to acquit the innocent as readily, at least, as to convict the guilty.
This presents the inescapable dilemma of criminal procedure which
Bentham failed to recognize. For a procedure that does not assume
guilt, but seeks to determine it rationally, by its basic hypothesis provides
for innocence.
The dilemma consists in the fact that the easier it is made to prove
guilt, the more difficult does it become to establish innocence. Lack of
appreciation of the dual character of our criminal procedure is apparent
in much of the criminological reform movement in the recent past
which reflects hardly any suspicion that police and prosecutors are not
omniscient. The presumption that to be charged means to be guilty has
been tenaciously, if unconsciously, entertained by well-intentioned re-
formers lulled into complacency by humanitarian motives to substitute
"treatment" for purlishment, and enlightened by negligible insight into
the functions of criminal procedure. It can be demonstrated that their
agitation parallels Enrico Ferri's almost to the word; one has but to
read his condemnation of any presumption of innocence and of civil
liberties generally to know where such reform leads.1 The problem is
of paramount importance because of the challenge to elementary demo-
cratic values embodied in the Constitution and the' Bill of Rights-
largely a document of criminal procedure, and because, in conjunction
with the guarantees of the written instrument, criminal law and proce-
dure provide the most perfected inclusive safeguard against oppression
available. The danger here is especially great because most of the con-
7. FERRI, CRIMINAL SOCIOLOGY (Kelly & Lisle's trans. 1917) 445-46. Compare
Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 182-85, 189; Crimnal Attempt-A
Study of Foundations of Criminal Liability (1940) 49 id. at 829-31; Prolegomena to a
Science of Criminal Law (1941) 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 570-75.
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petent members of the bar are so utterly uninformed in this branch of
the law that the lawyers' criticism that can normally be expected con-
cerning importint proposed legal changes is non-existent.
Failure to appreciate the dual nature of American criminal procedure
is represented in a number of fallacies. The degree of error in the
fallacy that indictment means guilt is not reduced by the fact that the
police are honest and competent and that the probabilities are therefore
great that the accused committed the crimes charged against them.
Admittedly, under such conditions a generous and circumspect attitude
is required to give the presumption of innocence effect. Admittedly, also,
the presumption of innocence does not rest solely on ethical principle;
it equally represents stability of institutions, public confidence and the
probability that most guilty persons are convicted. But the overriding
considerations are that reliance is on rational procedure to determine guilt
or innocence, and that, whatever police competence and the statistics
suggest, we cannot form any intelligent judgment on this basis with
reference to any particular case. Statistical generalizations hold true
only for large numbers; even if 99% of all persons charged were con-
victed, this should not make the slightest difference in the judging of
any particular case.' A scientific dictator might "liquidate" all persons
accused by secret police in camera without compunction though he were
confident the police were in error in many eases. If we cleave to the
ethics of civilized peoples, we must reject statistics, or rather use them
where they function, and protect each individual accused person by
traditional safeguards and recognized canons of fairness.
Related to the above fallacy is much of the criticism dramatized by
,'mortality" tables which, analogizing from mechanics, applies engineer-
ing principles of "efficiency" in disregard of the more persuasive, rele-
vant explanation that insufficient evidence warranted nolle prosequi,
dismissal or acquittal.
Thirdly, there is the fallacy of arguing that because the accused had
so few rights in the 16th and 17th centuries, therefore he has too many
rights now. This view is not novel, and Stephen writing in 1863 noted
that "one of the commonest arguments against allowing prisoners to
be defended by counsel always was, that rogues had too many chances
of escape already." 9  The present form of this argument points to the
fact that until about 1700 an accused person could not testify in his own
behalf, be represented by counsel, have access to books, have a copy of
S. In reversing a conviction because the trial judge had instructed that "a man of
the abandoned character of the prisoner has not the presumption of innocence in his
favor," it was held "The presumption of innocence applies to every person charged with
a criminal offense in precisely the same way . . ." Slater v. IL M. Advocate, 1928
Scots L. T. 602, 606.
9. A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1863) 175.
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the indictment or other means of knowing the charge or the witnesses
who would testify against him. There were few restrictions on the evi-
dence that could be used against him; he could not call sworn witnesses
in his behalf. The trials were extraordinarily efficient, "never extending
beyond a day."' 0 It may be wise to place certain restrictions on the
present mode of criminal defense but it is obviously fallacious to pretend
that the necessity or wisdom results because the pendulum has swung
too far already in favor of the accused. We know that tinder present
safeguards, innocent persons are convicted, and the recent federal pro-
vision for compensation 1 implies that their number is not negligible.
Anyone with actual experience in the administration of criminal law
realizes that in the vast majority of cases the handicaps of fortune and
intelligence are so great as to make "equality" of the parties hardly
more than a humbug. The professional criminal undoubtedly has many
advantages but they result from his greater knowledge, financial and
political support, as well as from deficiencies in the substantive law.
There is wisdom in the observation that the substantive criminal law
should be designed for criminals, the procedural for honest people.
Certainly any revision in criminal procedure constructed with profes-
sional offenders particularly in mind, or on the supposition that "the
rogues have too many chances of escape" because of the 18th and 19th
century progress in safeguards, would result in a ritual whose efficiency
would be equalled only by its terror.
There is fourthly, the fallacy fetchingly described as "protection of
society against criminals." Group security is opposed to individual liberty,
with the clear implication that we must choose between them. This
separation of group from individual, of society from offender, is one
of the most vicious fallacies ever invented. Again it begins with the
presumption of guilt. It implies that any method of "social defense" is
permissible after one has been thus prejudged, and that any measures
of "prevention" are proper. Society is composed of individuals, but the
logic of the above authoritarian ideology would place every individual
outside the pale-should the occasion, as created by the logicians in
political control, arise. As a matter of fact, group security is a function
of individual security. If criminal procedure, is designed to facilitate
convictions, public security is imperilled. Pro tanto does "protection of
society" increase when each individual.,is protected from indiscriminate
and irrational exercise of official power. We may recognize that "society"
denotes a being different from the total number of its units, separated
one from the other, and realize at the same time, that "society" and
"individual" merely designate aspects of human nature, not any actual
10. ALLEN, LEGAL DuTiEs (1931) 269.
11. 52 STAT. 438 (1938), 18 U. S. C. § 729 (1940).
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antithesis. Though elaboration of the above thesis cannot be undertaken
here, it may still be urged that even if the above dichotomy of "society"
vs. "individual" be adopted as actual, a Revision Committee might well
ponder on the fact that federal prosecutions under present procedure
result in a remarkably high percentage of convictions.
All of the above fallacies result from failure to comprehend the im-
manent conflicting ends of any civilized criminal procedure. This duality
of objectives can be expressed mathematically, and it should be possible
to construct a calculus of the probabilities of decision as functions of
the conditions of trial, present or proposed; the range of variables wtould
be complete abandonment of any prosecution for criminal behavior, on
the one extreme, to treating every complaint as equivalent to conviction,
on the other. In the absence of a forensic sociology, such objectivity
would be hypothetical, but such a deliberate exercise would accentuate
the implications of the basic axiom of criminal procedure. It might even
provide the bare outlines of a future empirical science of procedure.
Fortunately there is little likelihood of any present drastic curtailment
of the basic guarantees of the Constitution and Bill of Rights. What lies
closer at hand is the possible ignoring of the nicer ramifications of the
above principles, the temptation to remedy substantive defects by proce-
dural reforms, and to compensate for incompetent administration, e.g.,
in prosecution, by loading additional burdens on the accused, or in sen-
tencing, by radical curtaihnent of judicial functions.
Such motivation is rarely perceived; the reforms are advanced under
the aegis of logic and science. Thus, as to sentencing by "experts", ma-
jority verdict, and notice of a plea of alibi or of insanity. It is impossible
to discuss these proposals here but there are relevant factual considerations
that may be briefly indicated. As to alibi, it is apparent that the need
for notice by the prosecutor has been grossly exaggerated.12 Any com-
petent prosecutor anticipates defenses, and in certain crimes alibi is
commonplace. Besides, aid to prosecution is problematic in some juris-
dictions where alibi notice is required, because courts are then prone to
restrict the proof to the precise day on which the crime is alleged to
have occurred. There is greater reason for requiring notice of insanity
since this defense is relatively rare and, also, requires considerable special
preparation to meet.
But the major consideration that gives pause to the wholesale adoption
of reforms designed to facilitate conviction results from a judgment
on the total situation, one that is characterized normally by a powerful
state with practically unlimited resources arrayed against an impotent
individual. Hence a great many informed persons, who would readily
12. Compare Stayton & Watkins, Is Specific Notice of the Defense of Alibi Desir-
able? (1940) 18 TEx. L. Ray. 151.
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concede, the abstract fairness of many reforms if the parties were evenly
matched, are loath to increase the resources of an already vastly superior
litigant. Thus with reference to the apparently desirable extension of
depositions, it is clear that unless accused persons are in fact enabled
to be present and to take depositions, the reform aids the state only.
Accoidingly it is insisted that even such neutral reforms must be judged
in light of the facts relevant to their actual administration. The difficulty
is that the poor, the ignorant and the impotent hardly ever get their
needs understood, much less, fully provided for. One of the most gener-
ously motivated measures in recent years, the public defender, illustrates
the impasse. The statistics on the increased pleas of guilty and on huge
"savings to the taxpayers"' 13 reveal only too clearly that, at best, the
plan represents a lesser of existing evils. Perhaps the most that can be
hoped for is that a sympathetic understanding of actual conditions will
temper paper plans for relentless application of logic to criminal proce-
dure.
OTHER LIMITATIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF SCIENTIFIC
METHODS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Certainly sound revision will employ ldgic to discard useless ritual and
advance rational procedure. Certainly such revision must employ all
relevant science and scientific method, e.g., in analysis of the rules of
evidence. But revision will not only miss its mark, it will be positively
harmful if it does not subject each proposal to analysis in light of the
basic duality of criminal procedure, in effect, if it does not weigh the
ethical import of any proposed measure of reform, and do so in full
awareness of the actualities that determine the outcome of criminal
prosecutions. The formula is simple: logic and science must be limited
by policy; but the application is difficult and calls for the nicest integra-
tion of experience in actual criminal administration with the subtlest
comprehension of the ethical implications of criminal procedure. Under
such conditions and with such objectives, revision will frequently eschew
science for less effective methods. The existing preference is apparent
when we consider that a criminal trial turns almost exclusively on human
testimony. Homo sapiens talks and there is accordingly available the
best possible evidence of human conduct - communication by the actor.
Hence the insistence of the mediaeval inquisitor upon "confession or
else" was no less logical and scientific than grim. In our books and in
the courts, we abjure torture (though the police are not always so un-
scientific!) ; in effect, we even tell suspects not to talk because their
statements will be held against them. We have constitutional guarantees
13. See Goldman, Economies Effected by Public Defender Plan (1939) 23 J. Am.
JUD. Soc. 63, and recent reports from the office of the Public Defender of Cook County.
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against self-incrimination; we make some sincere effort to provide cotmsel
to guard against indiscretions. All of this is illogical in the extreme,
considering that disclosure by the defendant would be the simplest, the
cheapest and very frequently the best evidence of what we seek to know.
The point here is not that we must accept every existing limitation on
trial methods as an absolute value -for example, it is at least debatable
whether comment on the defendant's failure to testify should not be
permitted -but that we must recognize as fully as possible that we do
impose such limitations, and that each involves a basic question of policy
that operates directly contra the relevant logic.
There are other considerations regarding the application of scientific
methods in criminal procedure. Indeed the most perplexing of all prob-
lems of legal reform is presented by demands for total logicality, for
such a streamlining of procedure as to extract completely the game, the
drama, the battle. Insistence on business efficiency, total condemnation
of the jury, appeals for decision by experts and for scientific investiga-
tion as opposed to "trial by battle" are the familiar proposals. Their
initial persuasiveness cannot be denied; but their relevance to and utility
for criminal trials must be carefully weighed nonetheless. It is submitted
that criminal procedure serves other functions than purely logical and
scientific decision; that, indeed, in light of the facts, there are and, for
an unforseeable future, will continue to be, sharp limits on the availa-
bility and utility of scientific methods in criminal procedure. The argu-
ment in support cannot be elaborated here but the outlines of the thesis
must be briefly indicated.
Criminal law is people's law in a sense that applies to no other depart-
ment of law. Indeed, for most persons criminal law is the only very
familiar law because of almost daily actual and vicarious participation
in its process. Most persons may know little of the technicality of either
substantive or procedural law, but they can follow the rational outline of
the conduct of the trial; a sense of security results that could never be
provided by an expert operating in secret chambers or by little known
formulas. 14 Hence criminal procedure constitutes a social situation which
finds little counterpart in the administration of complicated property
interests or other relatively impersonal affairs. Certainly the differen-
tiation of such matters from more simple human rights, intuitively
understood in the light of our history of civil liberties, supplies one clue
to the recent direction of important judicial decisions. Beyond popular
understanding of and participation in the processes of criminal law,
there are other reasons for questioning the unmitigated application tf
science and scientific methods to criminal procedure. The criminal law
in large measure represents an intimate self-government. The supplanting
14. Compare BEcc.ARiA, ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISEMMTS (3d ed. 1770) 53, 55.
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of popular institutions, especially those productive of confidence against
abuse, with government by scientists would challenge public opinion,
especially if effected by the recommendations of persons appointed by
officials who were themselves appointees. We must recognize that the
axioms of self-government and the democratic process imply that the
best methods may temporarily, at least, be rejected although it is cer-
tainly defensible to maintain that in the long run social problems are
best solved by consensuses freely arrived at rather than by imposition
-even by disinterested specialists.
Finally, it is evident, also, that criminal procedure discharges non-
rational functions which cannot presently be ignored. The thesis in this
regard may be stated somewhat paradoxically: it is rational to employ
criminal procedure, in part, to satisfy non-rational needs. The confidence
aroused by the order, publicity and rationality of criminal procedure has
been noted. But there are even deeper instinctual needs that cannot soon
be modified. No reform of criminal procedure may lightly ignore the
public "sense of justice", the interminable conflict between conscience
and animal desire, or the criminal trial as a vicarious avenue of
emotional release which supports the delicate balance of adjustment to
social restraint. It is one thing to damn such emotional need and to look
for a wiser direction of it; nonetheless it must be recognized that the
present form of criminal procedure does take it into account in appre-
ciable degree. Revision pointed not at Utopia but at the immediate future
must make provision for such phenomena as well as for the other social
functions of criminal procedure.
It is in the context of the above general functions and objectives of
American criminal procedure that the present Revision must be placed.
In the light of understanding of the basic problems, the specific needs
and objectives of the current project become significant. These more
immediate problems are numerous. Indeed, concerning the law of federal
criminal procedure, it is almost possible to say there is none; that what
is required is provision not revision. Certainly there is nothing approach-
ing inclusive statutory law. The rules are scattered through the Consti-
tution, the Revised Statutes, the Judicial and Penal Codes, and the
decisions. The enactments are partial; they deal with special offenses
and segments of the procedure. Obviously some over-all hypothesis of
general procedural law was essential to the functioning of the federal
system; in large measure this was supplied by "the common law" and by
the common law of the states as of 1789. Nonetheless many divergencies
exist. Some federal courts do not follow state procedure, as in New
York (until 1936) where the names of witnesses are not written on
[Vol. 51 : 723734
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indictments. Uncertainties abound: the procedure on standing mute to
an information, the requirements for issuance of search warrants, the
plea in abatement which has developed sufficient technicalities to warm
the hearts of even the sons of Zeruiah, the special plea in bar which must
be carefully distinguished, and the like as regards demurrer and motion
to quash. In light of the utter inadequacy of the statutory law, it is not
surprising that the adoption by judicial decision of such major procedural
changes as waiver of jury and testimony of husband and wife, setting
aside many years of precedent to the contrary, provoked no criticism.
What is rather surprising is the excellent standard of performance con-
sistently maintained in federal criminal administration, revealing what
can be accomplished by a highly competent personnel with grossly in-
adequate instruments.
"PROCEDURE" AND "SUBSTANCE"
An initial difficult task for Revision is determination of the limits
of "procedure". It is impossible here to analyze the relevant case-law,
but we may indicate some of the chief aspects of the problem.
Recent emphasis on "function" has tended to stress a point of view
from which all law may be regarded as "procedural". Certainly all law
is "procedural" in the sense of commanding conduct, of having signifi-
cance for action. So, also, it is clear that without remedy and procedure,
legal rights would have little, if any, practical utility. Hence it has been
argued that "the distinction between substantive and procedural law is
artificial and illusory. In essence, there is none. "5 But such insights
as these must not obscure the facts that there are important meanings
with reference to which significant differences must be drawn, and that,
especially from a precise functional point of view, formulated in terns
of the variety of jobs to be done, it is essential to distinguish "substance"
from "procedure". Generalization about "substance" and "procedure"
is, of course, hazardous because of the variety of usage and function
of ideas subsumed under each of these terms. The common differen-
tiation is misleading chiefly in suggesting the lesser importance of "proce-
dure". But if we recall constitutional and other basic guarantees, it is
obvious that much more than "mere instrument" is included in "proce-
dure". Even as to those procedural rules that serve purely logical
functions in governing argument, it is apparent that they contribute
15. 1 CHAMBERLAYNE, EVIDENCE (1911) § 171. This point of view has been stressed
by Professor W. MI. Cook who has argued that "procedure" i' not a fi~xed entity, that
the term is variously employed, that particular purposes detennine differentiation between
"procedure" and "substance" and that the chief objectives have been uniformity, conve-
nience and fairness. Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws (1933)
42 YALE L. J. 333. The latest article, which refers to much of the general literature on
the problem, is Kocourek, Substance and Procedure (1941) 10 ForDnnAm L Rv. 157.
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substantially to the nature of the decision, since we seek rational decisions
and rationality is determined by the methods employed. These considera-
tions qualify the following analysis.
In the context of the total legal system certain rules (procedure) are
described as "adjective" or "subordinate", or "merely instrumental" to
other rules (substantive law). These terms are relative and formal
rather than real. For substantive law may itself be viewed as merely
a means to ends set by ethical and other non-legal criteria, such as deter-
rence, incapacitation, reformation, and the subsumption of these tinder
"prevention". But crime prevention may also be regarded as but a means
to an ideal of human relations, a means ultimately to "the good life."
Clearly means and ends may continue thus in indefinite progression until
all is subsumed under a generalization so broad as to include the heart's
desire. Despite insistence on rigorous separation of ethical principles
from positive law and the artificiality of actual separation of "means"
and "ends" as regards the process of decision, it is permissible, indeed,
necessary for some purposes to regard a legal system as including within
itself various stipulations as to ends; and, therefore, within that system,
to make distinctions relative thereto. Within these limits, the most fun-
damental distinction is that between rules that serve as ends and those
that are instruments to the attainment of these ends.", "Procedure" in-
cludes all those rules that prescribe the methods required to achieve
whatever ends are legally "given". In this approach we accept the exist-
ing legal system "as is" as regards interests presently protected, and as
regards the philosophy implicit in the existing law. The "concretization"
of the substantive norm applicable in any given case occurs within a
varying extent of choices. And we have only to consider the dependence
of this choice (the particular content of the finally "discovered" sub-
stantive rule) upon, and its relation to, the methods employed to "dis-
cover" it, to recognize the inaptness of considering the latter subordinate,
merely adjective, in any other than a formal sense.
The end-fixing rules, designated "substantive", are prescriptions ex-
pressed in terms denoting circumstances or hypotheses, on the one hand,
and consequences or sanctions, on the other. These rules signify that
on the occurrence of the described facts certain other facts must be
applied - in criminal law, treatment or punishment. They also designate
the values protected and implemented by the legal system. These rules
operate caliper-like; from the whole buzzing welter of reality, they mark
out particular segments, thereafter "legally significant", the "ends" of
the legal system. Why particular circumstances rather than others are
selected, why particular penalties are applied, these are not our present
concern. What does concern us here is first, that facts constituting
16. See 2 BENTHAM, WORKS (Bowring's ed, 1843) 5.
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hypotheses or circumstances do not announce themselves, but must be
"found"; and secondly, that "finding" the facts has meaning only by
reference to end-fixing, "substantive" penal laws. Not because it is
descriptive of actual psychological processes or their chronology, but
rather because it suits the convenience of analysis and the modem habit
of thought do we think of substantive law as pre-existing. What is
wanted is an authoritative rational judgment that particular facts are
included within the circumstances described in laws; it is the special job
of "procedure" to regulate the process of providing such decisions.
The specific character of rules of procedure can be more sharply indi-
cated by considering that they are similar to "tecluical" rules, i.e., as
stating methods necessary to arrive at desired goals. But rules of proce-
dure also partake of the character of all law in that they, too, are norma-
tive. Hence their necessity is not identical with that of rules, e.g., of
bridge-building." The kinship of procedure and technical rules may be
further perceived, if we recall that rules of procedure do not include
sanctions for their violation, as do substantive rules. If counsel omits to
demur to a substantially defective indictment, he simply fails to achieve
the desired end. The rules of procedure do not impose legal obligations
as do substantive rules. The effect, "sanction", is simply that the litigant
cannot possibly arrive at the desired destination. Failure to plead cor-
rectly may, of course, form the hypothesis of a rule of tort law, but it
is violation of that substantive rule, imposing a duty to exercise due
care, that gives rise to damages, not any sanction attached to the rules
of procedure themselves.
These distinctions, instrument from end, techmical rules from norms
that include sanctions, seem clear, but the difficulties of application may
be illustrated by reference to "arrest". "Arrest" is included in authori-
tative analyses of criminal procedure from Hale to the Code of the
American Law Institute. Obviously if we focus on the practical end of
punishing offenders, we must certainly apprehend them, and arrest is
merely instrumental thereto. But if the end is judicial decision, the
presence of the defendant is not a logical prerequisite.18 Salmond limits
procedure to "that branch of the law which governs the process of liti-
gation,"'I and this clearly excludes the law of arrest. Again it is apparent
that in tort law "arrest" has quite a different significance. The rules
mean there, that under prescribed conditions an officer is "privileged"
to apprehend, which is equivalent to asserting that he is excepted from
17. Compare the observation that "procedure" should be distinguished from "jaw".
TnAYER, A PRET.T?, NARY TREATIsE ON EVIDENCE (IS98) 193.
18. In a number of states, the defendant may waive this right and he does so if he
voluntarily absents himself. Miss. CoD ANN. (1930) § 1276; Omo Gse.. Corz Azaz.
(Page, 1937) § 13442-10; so also in Arkansas, Canada and New Zealand.
19. JumIsPRuDENcE (7th ed. 1924) 495-96.
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the general duty to refrain from conduct designated "assault" and "im-
prisonment". The nature and significance of these rules on arrest can
therefore be comprehended only when they are viewed as qualifiers of
the normal substantive rules. Thus considered, they are themselves rules
of substantive law since, it is apparent, it is for convenience and simplicity
only that the total relevant substantive law is stated in separate propo-
sitions.
Accordingly, with reference to whether "arrest" is "procedure" or
"substance", we find not only the necessity to distinguish some of the
rules on arrest from others, but, also, even after this restriction of the
relevant area, we find tradition and practical objectives pointed in one
direction, logic in the opposite. There are still other difficulties. So far
as the current undertaking is concerned, it must be anticipated that the
courts will cleave rather closely to "procedure" as limited to the regula-
tion of the trial, and that, within these limits, they will be further
restrained not only by the safeguards imposed by the Constitution and
Bill of Rights but also by case-law interpreting the ex post facto guar-
antee to the effect that the defendant must not be deprived of any "sub-
stantial" right, including changes in procedure that operate to his dis-
advantage." Theoretically this limitation on ex post facto laws should
not affect other lekislation; a potential area would be available - sub-
stantial changes that do not violate constitutional guarantees. There are
numerous difficulties, whichever path is taken. In view of the conditions
of the rule-making, it is likely that the standard of "substantial disad-
vantage" will be extended generally, But almost any change in procedure
may threaten the present allocation of advantage, e.g., selection of the
jury by the court with consequent elimination of counsel's preliminary
suggestions. The existing decisions provide little aid in application of
this vague test. They merely suggest that "procedure" will be rigorously
limited to the more technical problems of regulating the trial.21 No doubt
the courts will be especially anxious to impose no disadvantage on de-
fendants in criminal cases, and will interpret "procedure" accordingly.
It is obvious that questions of policy are here involved and that decisions
will be made that rest only partially on legal doctrine. Provision of a
greater range of choice, however, would not be diminished in ultimate
utility by the fact that only part of the program is adopted by one branch
of the government initially.
20. See McAllister, Ex Post Facto Laws in the Supreme Court of the United States
in 2 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1938) 1351, 1355-60.
21. With reference to the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it has been held that
the burden of proof is "substance." Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S. 208,
212 (1939) ; and a district court dismissed a complaint for failure to allege freedom front
contributory negligence. Francis v. Humphrey, 25 F. Supp. 1 (E. D. Ill. 1938).
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PROBLEMS SUGGESTED BY THE NEW RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE
The new Rules of Civil Procedure are among the most important re-
forms in our legal history. There is nmuch to be learned from that
undertaking as regards organization of the present work, the conduct
and criticism of proposals, the public debate and publicity so effectively
maintained. One objective of the new rules was uniformity; there is
no reason for questioning the like for criminal procedure. Federal
criminal procedure is not governed by the Conformity Act as was the
civil; the difficulties and divergencies in practice are no less numerous
for reasons noted above. Since the crossing of state lines is convn. i-
place, uniformity would lessen the burdens imposed on bar and judiciary.
Final appraisal obviously rests on the quality of the procedure that is
urged for general adoption; there is no merit in uniformity apart from
that.
There are many provisions in the new rules which can be closely
applied to criminal procedure, such as abolition of the demurrer and
various special pleas, elimination of restrictions on time previously im-
posed by expiration of court terms, provision for free amendment (that
would need to be limited as regards indictments), the order of jurisdic-
tional defenses, the abolition of bills of exceptions and of the taking
of formal exception to rulings by the court, and the official forms. In
general, as regards the purely technical rules, those that are neutral as
to advantage, the new civil rules are always suggestive and sometimes
can be applied almost literally to criminal procedure. The great prestige
of private law and of the new rules, their wide acceptance and their
merits will also suggest very strongly the adoption of their major specific
reforms which would seem to constitute the areas of greatest promise.
Consequently the suggested application of these reforms to criminal
procedure will require the most careful consideration and the maximum
technical knowledge.
Among the most important of these reforms in the new rules-- are
the provisions for joinder, pre-trial conference and discovery. As regards
joinder, the underlying policy of the new rules is certainly sound: the
settlement at one time of all controversies between all parties whose dis-
putes involve common questions of law and fact. By comparison the
rules of criminal procedure on joinder seem primitive. They are vague
and variant. The civil rules stimulate to discovery of the relevance of,
at least, their general principles. It is apparent, at the outset, that the
civil rules necessarily have a far greater range because they may include
any number of parties with claims and counterclaims against each other,
whereas in the criminal law, the process is much simpler; there is not
22. See Clark, The Proposed Federal Riles of Civil Proecdurc (1936) 22 A. B. A.
J. 447.
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only a single party bringing the action, but also, the interests of all
defendants, however numerous, run solely against that one party, not
against each other. In addition, the field of private law is quantitatively
much larger and more diverse. Hence the utility of the identical pro-
vision for joinder is narrowed considerably in the criminal law. But
the lessened potentialities should not dull the desire to advance the
principle as far as desirable. At the very least, thorough analysis of the
analogous problems in criminal procedure would greatly clarify this
presently most confused of all its areas. Much more may be possible.
It is difficult to generalize regarding the problems resulting from the
presently very diverse rules and practices. They arise from: (1) joinder'
of counts is rigorously limited to cognate offenses, (2) the notion of
"transaction" has been of little aid to joinder because of insistence on
the preceding limitation or on a common mode of trial, (3) separation
of parties and trials is required where there is likelihood of prejudice,
and as regards co-defendants in a criminal case, the possibility of preju-
dice is great and (4) the joinder of indictments has been restricted to
cases of practically identical proof throughout. It is impossible here
to discuss the reasons adduced for such rigorous separation of counts,
indictments and trials; they include confounding the accused, prejudicing
him in his challenges, suggesting that he is an habitual criminal, con-
fusing the jury, and others.23
The most fruitful single avenue of attack upon the above problems
would seem to be implementation of "transaction" so far as the orbit
of criminal behavior is concerned. In this regard it may be noted that
present procedure, though quite restrictive as to joinder of counts or
indictments, ranges widely as concerns admission of evidence of other
crimes tending to establish the commission of the one charged.24 If these
rules are valid, it would seem proper, and in any event, it is certainly
logical, to present a complete picture of the defendant's criminal behavior
rather than a severely isolated segment of it. In fact, criminal behavior,
especially of professionals, normally occurs not in isolated events but in
series of transactions. Thus, in the business of dealing in stolen bonds,
the behavior of a group of persons may include conduct that constitutes
larceny, burglary, robbery, false pretenses, forgery, receiving stolen
property, transportation across state lines, possession of stolen securities
and other offenses. The murder of a bank guard may have been im-
mediately preceded by robbery or burglary, theft of an automobile, carry-
ing concealed weapons. Present reliance upon a conspiracy count is
limited, opportunistic and frequently unfair. The logic of the facts
argues for far greater flexibility of criminal pleading along lines sug-
23. See McElroy v. United States, 164 U. S. 76 (1896).
24. See (1931) 29 MICH. L. Ra. 473.
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gested by the new civil rules, and by the rules of evidence. No hardship
need result from the fact that different modes of trial are usually required
on the basis of gravity of offense, since the one prescribed for the major
crime charged could be had for all, and this presumably offers greatest
protection of the defendant's rights.
The major difficulties result from the fact that criminal trials differ
markedly from civil ones. In civil litigation personal prejudice is a minor
affair, but in criminal prosecutions there must be constant vigilance that
an accused is not convicted simply because he is a notorious person, or
because he has a record, or has dealt with criminals, or by allegation
of numerous offenses, no one of which can be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. Again, in civil law every single obligation is important; if a
corporation owes $1,000,000 but has a counterclaim for ten cents, that
should be taken into account. On the other hand, in criminal la,, not
only is it impracticable to prosecute for every crime committed by an
individual, it would be unnecessary to do so in some instances, absurd
in others. A convict pays with his life -at a more or less accelerated
speed and he has only a particular limited expectancy; the utility of
piling up a criminal record beyond possibility of significance for him
is quite a different affair from its logical civil counterpart. The practice
is to convict on the maximum charge possible, and to ignore the rest
except for purposes of fixing sentence and determining parole. Finally,
in civil cases the litigants incur expenses, and their time is valuable. These
are incentives not only to compromise and continue decent relations, but
also to take a strictly economic appraisal of the litigation. The matter
is utterly different in the vast majority of prosecutions where the de-
fendants have nothing to gain or to lose - except life or liberty. Espe-
cially in cases where persons of affluence are defendants, the saving of
expenses is a minor affair as compared with conviction or imprisonment.
These factors apply also to discovery before trial with the added
possibility of abuse on both sides; on the one, the temptation to indict
first and get the proof later; 2 on the other, to secure information to
perfect improper defenses. Finally, as to pre-trial conferences, it must
be noted that the need here is not nearly so great as in civil litigation
because in the criminal law the preliminary hearing has traditionally
served to check irresponsible accusation.2 1 Pre-trial conference may have
25. "But I have known rich men whose characters were ruined by unwarranted in-
dictments under which they were never convicted, and I have known others who spent
their every dollar and beggared their families defending indictments which should never
have been found." Black, The Progress of a Criminal Case in 7 Lr-nP.Fs o: Lrm: n
Topics (1929) 339, 345.
26. Compare "This wasteful method of [private] litigation was perhaps the more
remarkable because criminal procedure provided a very effective means for promptly
eliminating apparent controversies which had no merit." Sunderland, Theory and Prac:-
tice of Pre-Trial Procedure (1937) 21 J. A.. Jup. Soc. 125.
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value in certain federal prosecutions, and the limited use of the pre-
liminary hearing in federal procedure certainly argues for some pro-
vision in that regard. But it will be noted that in the instances of its
use, recently reported, the defendants' stipulations resulted in suspended
sentences.17 In view of the fact that such conferences are commonly
held between prosecutor and defense counsel and that the prosecutor is
in a rather different position than counsel for a private litigant, the
above use of pre-trial conference suggests that compromise is the only
additional advantage, i.e., compromise beyond what the prosecutor thinks
necessary. But in criminal proceedings, compromise (except in a few
minor offenses) is, at best, a practical necessity,28 not a proper end,
in itself.
Since the basic objectives of criminal law differ radically from those
of private law, reforms that are essential to the one may be irrelevant
to or even harmful in the other. Criminal law is ultimately concerned
with judgments that have moral significance and that are implemented
by the imposition of punishment. Hence many procedures that are
logical and worthy, judged by other standards, fall far short of the
mark in this field. Only detailed studies of the suggested provisions and
of the rules, practices, actual conditions, distinctive problems and objec-
tives of criminal prosecutions can provide the knowledge required to
determine how far, if at all, the above reforms are applicable to criminal
procedure.
A major problem for Revision, indeed for law-making of any kind,
that is only very generally suggested by the new rules, concerns the
form of the total product of the undertaking. The new Rules of Civil
Procedure are not complete in themselves but it is possible that every-
thing feasible in that field was provided. The present condition of federal
criminal procedure requires legislation that is inclusive and complete,
rather than complementary and fragmentary. The need for brevity
requires the writer to state his conclusions in this regard with little effort
to develop the antecedent steps. In the writer's view the end-product
should be a code of federal criminal procedure. A code, in contrast
to statutes, will be relatively complete, offering little occasion to look
elsewhere to fill lacunae - except as to constitutional provisions, where
the total existing body of decisions will continue to define them, and will
be augmented as in the past. Secondly, a code will be completely organ-
ized along lines suggested by logic, chronology and subject-matter, so
that the various provisions are readily accessible. But the major benefit
27. Way, New Technique Facilitates Criminal Trials (1941) 25 J. Am. JVD. Soc.
120.
28. The expansion of the use of summons for directions in England in 1932 did not
include torts based on fraud or malice, false imprisonment or seduction. See Sunderland,
op. cit. supra note 26, at 128.
[Vol. 51 : 723
PROCEDURAL OBJECTIVES
will be the aid rendered interpretation, the day-to-day work of lawyers
and courts; the ultimate criticism of the end-product of Revision must
surely include its utility in the judicial process. Any judgment in this
regard must rest upon a broad base that includes appreciation of the
ever-mounting volume of case-law and the consequent difficulties both
practical and theoretic that perplex the common lawer; it must include
some sophistication concerning tie actual civilian judicial process as
contrasted with its character a century ago or that provided in the literary
versions of its apologists; and it must result from a careful cinsideration
of the special problems of criminal procedure.
Flexibility of common law has been extolled as against an alleged
rigidity of code law, but it is a serious question whether "flexibility"
does not now threaten to become a mere euphemism to cloak completely
"free decision." We cannot elaborate the issues here nor their general
significance for the private law. What is axiomatic in the field of crime,
assuming the preservation of American traditions, is that officials must
be rigorously limited as regards the major guarantees provided by crim-
inal procedure. The choice actually presented may be one between evils;
however, if the vagueness of present federal criminal procedure provides
such flexibility as almost to eliminate restrictions on official judgment,
then, at least, we encounter no new danger in this regard if we turn
to a code.
There are several reasons for believing that a code will function
more effectively in the field of criminal procedure than in many others.
It has been generally recognized that codes have been more widely used
in public law than in private; and even Carter conceded that as to "the
procedure of courts of justice . . . it is important that this should be
regulated by written rules framed beforehand. . . ." The present
project, incorporating both public and procedural law, would therefore
seem especially propitious for codification. Moreover, procedure as usually
defined is concerned with a rigorously restricted segment of reality-
chiefly certain occurrences within a courtroom. The significant categories
are few, and the job of standardization is relatively simple. Finally,
these rules are addressed almost exclusively to professionals. Greater
competence, uniform training, and knowledge of technical terms would
facilitate the successful operation of a code of criminal procedure.
The danger of perpetuating the commoni law bias in statutory inter-
pretation is lessened, the likelihood of creating new psychological atti-
tudes and habits is greater if a code is provided. It must be recognized.
of course, that the problems of language, interpretation and application
29. CARTER. THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OuR Co iui LAW (184) 19. He
anticipated the present reform by urging that: "The true wisdom in relation to this suit-
ject is to deal with it in a wax" which affords the advantages of statutory law-" xvithout
its evils: and that is to entrust it to the courts to frame rules fur its regulatin." Ibid.
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are perennial and common to all legal systems, and that no code would
actually be complete and adequate except for a brief period, since human
prescience is limited and external change is constant. Sound revision,
seeking better methods, not Utopian simplicity, will indulge in no denials
of the persisting complexity of any enlightened judicial process. But
much, it is submitted, can be accomplished by codification, supplemented
by provision for periodical inventories and critical appraisals of the code
in light of subsequent case-law, and for periodic amendment in light of
new needs, ideas and preferences. Although the code would not include
the commentaries of the revisionists, these would be published simul-
taneously, illustrated by specific decisions. The preparation of these com-
mentaries is no less difficult than it is essential. It is difficult because
it calls for examination and critical appraisal of the total body of relevant
case-law, at least in all the states and federal districts, as well as for
the additional researches described below. It is essential to improved
adjudication because it makes readily accessible helpful commentaries on
and authoritative r~sum~s of the case-law.
In the past, the basic difficulty with codification has been the actual
inadequacy of codes and commentaries which no amount of exhortation
has concealed. A degree of rigidity is endured, but a saturation point
is reached inevitably and courts have taken the obvious necessary steps
-despite code and despite commentary. But it must be recognized that
social change and need constituted only one side of the formula; the
other phase of the problem was posed by the traditional difficulties in
the way of amendment of the law. The outstanding merit of the new
legislation on rules of procedure is provision for continuous and deliber-
ate law-making in this field. In the polarity of law and society, we may
take "society" as given, as denoting institutional changes that confront
us and challenge existing ways of control. The most developed instru-
ment of control is provided by the legal apparatus; if we can set up
competent agencies to study and reform the laws, we avoid the need for
circumvention via concealed judicial legislation - at least normally and
as regards major changes. We provide for flexibility of the code, and
meet the major criticism levelled at all efforts to advance codification.
Accordingly it must be stressed that a basic corollary of codification is
periodic revision.
An integral part of codification, indeed of any legislation, is the
language problem. It is necessary to supplement the remarks above on
pleading by considering briefly the current emphasis on simplicity, pre-
cision and the like. Certainly any simplification that results from mod-
ernization of vocabulary is a worthy objective. In large part, the present
terminology is a vestige of literal translation of Latin phrases, e.g.,
force and arms, breaking close, malice aforethought. Although many of
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these linguistic archaisms are warp and woof of substantive law, neces-
sary linguistic reform might well begin with procedure even though the
terms employed would require translation into the substantive tradition-
alisms, pending like reform of the latter. On the other hand, the language
problem includes much more than modernization of terms. For, it is
apparent, the common statement of objectives, "clarity", "simplicity",
'precision" and the like, masks rather than explains the problems. "Sim-
plicity" suggests elimination of unnecessary technicality-but "neces-
sity" is not obviously or automatically determined. "Clarity" argues for
elimination of indefiniteness; and "precision" for univocal, not ambig-
uous, provisions. But all such characterizations are mere symbols ,f
generalities, themselves too vague to be clear or precise. They have no
greater utility than any number of similar slogans which are unexcep-
tionable only because they are vague.
In the older eras of codification, to cite a specific instance, it was
assumed that a catalogue of "definitions" would simplify, clarify, etc.
But experience has demonstrated the elusive nature of such simplification
and that though a few definitions occasionally help, the desired ends
can only be attained in part, by consistent use of the terms throughout
the code. This formal phase of the problem is relatively simple. The
much more difficult aspect is semantical; what we are chiefly concerned
with is the accurate consistent reference of terms to substantially similar
situations. To facilitate this objective would require a terminology con-
structed on the ample experience of past decisions where ambiguities
and inconsistencies could be discovered. Beyond that it is evident that
if we have learned anything at all about "clearness", "simplicity" and
the like, it is that the simplest provisions are apt to be the most ambig-
uous, that superficial "clarity" is most frequently confusing. The tin-
expressed premise in such pretension is wide discretion, a function of
paramount concern in the criminal law. Such provision may be the best
available regarding those phases of procedure that defy precise formu-
lation beforehand; in the alternative, it is evident that such "solution"
simply begs the problem, passing the powers and the difficulties on to
the bench. A series of narrow rules may serve the desired ends better
than a few blanket generalities. \Ve confront here the recurring conflict
between technicality and common sense. Whatever the desirability of
sweeping provisions for private litigation, the student of recent develop-
ments in criminal law will cherish a wholesome skepticism concerning
pretensions to attainment of "substantial justice" in criminal cases at the
cost of precise accusation and specific, known procedures. We should keep
in mind that, in this context, common sense procedure means, finally,
enlarged discretion of the trial judge; we must proceed accordingly in
light of the basic objectives of the criminal law. If Revision is fore-
19421
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
warned against the superficial simplicity and clarity of indiscriminate
generalizations, it may draw upon careful studies of case-law and prac-
tice to implement the desired ends by provisions whose precision and
clearness can be defended in light of reason and experience.
CONCLUSION
Judicial rule-making has the rare advantage of juxtaposing knowledge
of procedure and legislation. It thus represents a notable advance in
the direction of reforms advocated by Bentham and Livingston, and
that now familiarly known as a Ministry of justice. It may provide a
well-founded answer to the alleged inflexibility of codes. It is obviously
one solution to legislative indifference in the procedural field. Oi the
other hand, it must be recognized that serious questions arise from the
possession of the rule-making power by the courts, and that serious
limitations are imposed on revision, if narrowly conceived. The reforms,
long advocated, which sought to bridge the gap between courts and legis-
lature did not contemplate law-making by the courts."0 Whether the new
arrangement represents merely a partial, temporary advance which needs
correction in the direction of the English Rules Comnmittee with ultimate
resort to the legislature cannot be discussed here, although, it may be
remarked, it is rather curious that scholars who have strenuously opposed
recent trends towards centralization in administration are among the
enthusiasts for judicial rule-making - a position that may be defensible
on practical grounds of difference in personnel, training and tradition,
certainly not on principle. For it must not be forgotten that as the
result of the present delegation of power, the same branch of govern-
ment that makes the rules, interprets, applies and amends them. Some
of the implications of such concentration of power in the field of criminal
law have been noted above. What must be stressed in conclusion is that
the present revisionists must fully confront the likelihood of judicial
unwillingness to institute changes that will impose any serious disad-
vantage on either state or accused, that the project will be rigorously
confined to clarification of the existing procedure. If the objective is
thus narrowed, a critical appraisal of the Code of the American Law
Institute may suffice."' It is submitted, however, that the effort should
be to integrate the practical job in a broadly conceived program which
will not only assist the court in immediate needs, but will also delineate
the areas for further investigation irrespective of present limitations.
30. See 11 BENTHAM, WORKS (Bowring's ed. 1843) 35, 36; 1 L1viwSTON, CoMILE'rH
WORKS ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE (1873) 415.
31. The greatest limitation on the utility of the Institute Code for this purpose is
that the "Commentaries" do not state the reasons in support of the rules adopted hut are
simply digests of the decisions.
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Full advantage should be taken of a rare opportunity to plumb the basic
problems of criminal procedure and, at least, to initiate a thoroughgoing
program for continuing study and progressive reform. For beyond the
immediate task loom the more permanent objectives of Revision - in-
creased insight into the most effective methods of research in criminal
procedure, the discovery and careful formulation of standards of criti-
cism, knowledge of the functioning of the rules in actual administration,
and of the procedure of foreign systems and in specialized areas, as well
as provision for periodic amendment. There is no conflict between im-
mediate and permanent ends; on the contrary the value of the current
project will depend in large measure upon its orientation and progress
in the broader context of basic objectives.
